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Abstract The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an
ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A dis-
tinction is made between moral property-universals and
moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral
property-universals have the same ontological status as
non-moral property-universals; second, that moral prop-
erty-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal
world; third that these moral property-instances or -par-
ticulars have the same ontological status as non-moral
property-particulars.
Keywords Moral property  Moral laws  Ontological
status  Parfit’s non-metaphysical cognitivism  Light moral
ontology
We evaluate actions morally. We make such utterances as
1. ‘‘It is morally good of Fred to host the refugee Hasan’’
or
2. ‘‘It is morally good of anyone to help those in need.’’
As a Metaethical Cognitivist, I interpret many such
moral utterances as moral assertions by which we express
our belief in certain moral propositions. With sentence (1)
we express our belief in a proposition with a particular
moral content, namely that Fred’s hosting the refugee
Hasan is morally good; with sentence (2) we express our
belief in a proposition with a general moral content,
namely that it is morally good of anyone to help those in
need. Let us assume that both propositions are true. As
advocate of a realist conception of truth, for non-moral
propositions as well as for moral propositions, I ask: What
could the moral reality be like that makes such propositions
true? Which kinds of entities would it involve? My aim in
this article is, first, to propose a moral ontological sketch
for robust non-reductive realists, second, to give a few
arguments that speak for it, and third, to contest some
arguments which endorse the view that moral properties
are ontologically lighter than non-moral properties.
1 A Moral Ontological Sketch
The moral ontology I am proposing contains several kinds
of entities: First, I assume that there are action-particulars,
for example, Fred’s hosting the refugee Hasan at time
t. Second, I assume that there are property-particulars, the
bearers of which are action-particulars. Some of them are
non-moral property-particulars such as being happiness-
contributing, some are moral property-particulars such as
being morally good.1 Third, I assume that there are action-
universals, or kinds of action, for example, the action-
universal of hosting refugees or of helping the needy.
Fourth, I assume that there are property-universals which
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These are the four kinds of entities I will address in this
article, but, of course, they do not exhaust the kinds of
entities that are needed in a comprehensive ontology. Such
an ontology would also contain substances, relations,
events, both as universals and as particulars, etc. Some
readers might wonder why I have not included habits
(dispositions to react and to act). Habits are also said to be
morally good or bad. Hence one might think that I ought
also to assume habit-universals and habit-particulars.
However, in my view, habits are properties of persons. A
good habit, such as the virtue of temperance, is a disposi-
tional property of a person: it disposes him/her to act in a
certain way. Such a property can itself be a bearer of a
moral property. Therefore, to account for moral habits, it is
sufficient to assume property-universals and property-par-
ticulars, and higher-order property-universals and property-
particulars.
Next, the relationships between the four kinds of entities
I am assuming have to be explored. I will do this with the
help of Fig. 1, which utilizes Jonathan Lowe’s ontological
square (see Lowe 2006, 22). However, it has to be said
immediately that Lowe would not countenance the kinds of
entities I assume here.3
The relationships to be explored are instantiation and
characterization. First, the relationship between action-
universals and action-particulars is that of instantiation. An
action-particular is an instance of an action-universal.
Fred’s hosting the refugee Hasan is an instance of the
action-universal hosting refugees. In the same way is the
relationship between property-universals and property-
particulars one of instantiation. A property-particular is an
instance of a property-universal. The particular happiness-
conduciveness of Fred’s hosting Hasan is an instance of the
property-universal of being happiness-conducive, and the
particular moral goodness of Fred’s hosting Hasan is an
instance of the property-universal of being morally good.
Second, the relationship between action-universals and
property-universals is one of characterization. The action-
universal of helping those in need is characterized by the
non-moral property-universal of being happiness-con-
ducive and by the moral property-universal of being
morally good. In the same way, the relationship between an
action-particular and property-particulars is one of char-
acterization. Fred’s action of helping Hasan in his need is
characterized by the particular happiness-conduciveness
and by the particular goodness.
A question that needs to be addressed is what types of
relationship instantiation and characterization are. One
might think that we denote, with the expressions ‘‘instan-
tiation’’ and ‘‘characterization’’, relational property-uni-
versals or relational property-particulars, but this is not so.
Here they are conceived to be only formal predicates that
do not denote additional kinds of entities (Lowe 2006,
44–49). One could argue for this in the following way.
Fred’s hosting the refugee Hasan necessarily instantiates its
action-universal of hosting refugees. It is part of the
essence of Fred’s hosting the refugee Hasan that it is an
instance of the action-universal of hosting refugees. In the
same way, Fred’s action’s being morally good necessarily
instantiates its moral property-universal of being morally
good. It is part of the essence of this action’s moral
goodness that it is an instance of the property-universal of
being morally good. Similarly, one can say, regarding
characterization, that it is part of the essence of Fred’s
action’s being morally good that it characterizes Fred’s
action, because this particular moral goodness depends for
its very identity on its being Fred’s action’s moral
goodness.
Another reason for holding the view that ‘‘characteri-
zation’’ denotes no additional entity is motivated by trying
to avoid Bradley’s regress (Bradley 1893). For example, if
a particular goodness of an action-particular were con-
nected by a relation-particular (an instance of the charac-
terization-relation), then two more relation-particulars
would be needed: one to connect the action-particular to
the first relation-particular, another one to connect the first
action-universals are characterized by property-universals
are instantiated by are instantiated by
action-particulars are characterized by property-particulars
Fig. 1 Moral ontological
square
3 Lowe’s ontological square contains as fundamental kinds of
entities: substantial universals, individual substances, property uni-
versals and property instances.
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relation-particular to goodness, and so on. Bradley’s
regress threatens also if one understands the characteriza-
tion that holds between action-universals and their essential
properties as itself a relational property-universal. How-
ever, I understand characterization of an action-universal
by a property-universal in this way: it belongs to the
essence of an action-universal to have a certain essential
characteristic. It belongs to the essence of the action-uni-
versal of helping the needy to be morally good or morally
obligatory. Helping the needy would not be what it is if it
were not morally good or obligatory.
What is not yet clear from the Fig. 1 is the relation that
holds between certain non-moral properties and moral
properties of actions, considered as particulars as well as
universals. I propose that the relationship is one of
grounding. I illustrate this relationship with the help of
Fig. 2.
The moral property-particular of an action-particular is
grounded in some non-moral property-particulars of this
action. The moral property-particular of Fred’s action’s
being morally good is grounded in some non-moral prop-
erty-particulars of his action, such as the property-partic-
ular of his action’s bringing about more happiness in the
world than would have been otherwise. There is a sense in
which grounding is stronger than supervenience. The idea
is not just that a moral property-particular is instantiated iff
some non-moral property-particulars are instantiated, or
that there cannot be a difference in moral property-partic-
ulars without there being a difference in non-moral prop-
erty-particulars. Rather, grounding could be stated as
follows: The property-particular b of an action-particular
e is grounded in property-particular a iff a makes it the case
that e has b; or iff e’s being a makes e’s being b the case.4
Moreover, at the level of the universals, the relationship is
parallel: Moral property-universals are grounded in non-
moral property-universals. The property-universal of being
morally good is grounded in some non-moral property-
universals of the action-universal of helping the needy, for
example in the property-universal of being happiness-
conducive. Grounding is here, like instantiation and char-
acterization, regarded as a purely formal relationship, not a
relational property-universal.
2 Some Reasons for Holding a Rich
Non-Reductive Moral Ontology
So far I have sketched the basic elements and formal
relationships of a moral ontology which can be labeled as
‘‘Rich Non-Reductive Moral Ontology’’. However, some
might object that this ontology is far too rich. They could
claim that one can easily think of positions which are also
non-reductive, but much more economical. A first position
could hold that we need to assume nothing more than
action-particulars plus non-moral and moral property-uni-
versals. A second position could maintain that we need
merely assume action-particulars plus non-moral and moral
property-particulars. In what follows I will examine these
two positions. For reasons of space I will confine the dis-
cussion to moral properties and leave aside the discussion
of the ontology of actions.
2.1 There are Moral Property-Universals but No
Moral Property-Particulars
Some might claim that moral predicates denote moral
property-universals, and that it suffices to assume their
existence—there is no need to posit moral property-par-
ticulars. I will consider two possible arguments for this
claim.
The first argument might proceed from the thesis that all
properties are universals (see Armstrong 1997). A prop-
erty-universal such as greenness is instantiated by a par-
ticular chair. The particular instance of the universal is this
particular chair itself. There is no need to assume in
addition a particular greenness that characterizes this par-
ticular chair. Since all properties are universals, moral
properties are universals too. In response, there is an
argument in favor of assuming properties-particulars that
starts with perceptions (see Lowe 2006, 23–24). Our per-
ceptions seem to be of this greenness of this chair, this
roughness of this surface, this taste of this roast beef. Now,
perception involves a causal relation between perceiver and
perceived, but in order to participate in causal relation-
ships, the entities in question must be particulars. We might
also think of other properties of things. It is this particular
shape of a shoe that causes the particular imprint in the soil.
It is this particular weight of the man that causes the depth
of the imprint. These must be property-particulars of things
since they enter causal relationships. It is the particular way
that these things are which explains the form and depth of
the imprint in the soil. Thus, we have a good reason to
believe in the existence of property-particulars in general.
We have also good reason to believe in the existence of
non-moral property-particulars of action-particulars. Fred’s
action of hosting Hasan has the property of making Hasan
happier. It can be argued that this property is a property-
particular of Fred’s action, since it can also enter causal
relationships. The particular way the action is explains, for
example, Hasan’s new attitude and behavior. Now, if the
non-moral properties of Fred’s action are property-partic-
ulars, it is also reasonable to assume that the moral prop-
erty of Fred’s action is a property-particular as well, since
4 The relation of grounding is developed in Correia and Schnieder
(2012).
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it is grounded in some of the non-moral property-particu-
lars of the action.5
A second argument for assuming that moral properties
are universals might run as follows: Compare the proper-
ties of being morally good or bad, right or wrong (and so
forth) with the property of being a valid proof.6 Suppose
that a series of symbols written on a piece of paper presents
a valid proof. We might say that these symbols on the page
are particulars and exist in the spatio-temporal world.
However, their property of being a valid proof is not a
property-particular but rather a property-universal. Applied
to metaethics, then, one might say: Action-particulars are
part of the spatio-temporal world. However their property
of being morally good or bad is not a property-particular
but rather a property-universal. For example, Napoleon’s
action of invading Russia is an event (or rather series of
events) in the spatio-temporal world, that is, a particular
entity.7 The non-moral properties of this action, such as
bringing about immense suffering, are also property-par-
ticulars of this action. These non-moral properties make it
the case that Napoleon’s action has the moral property of
being wrong. However, this moral property of his action is
not a property-particular but rather a property-universal.
Thus, there are non-moral property-particulars but no
moral property-particulars. Moral properties are all prop-
erty-universals.
In my view, however, the comparison is flawed. Napo-
leon’s action is a particular (or a series of particulars), an
event or series of events in the spatio-temporal world. And
the symbols written on the paper are also particular entities
in the spatio-temporal world. However, these symbols
represent a valid proof. Thus, the symbols written on some
page do not have the property of being a valid proof but
rather the property of representing a valid proof. On the
other hand, Napoleon’s action itself has the property of
being wrong. I see the case as follows: If Napoleon’s action
is a particular entity, and if the wrong-making non-moral
properties of this action of bringing about immense human
suffering are also property-particulars, then it is reasonable
to assume that the moral property of being wrong is also a
property-particular of this action. Take another normative
property: a belief’s property of being justified. Let’s
assume that a version of reliabilism is true. A belief is a
particular state of a person. Let us say, further, that this
belief was produced in a reliable way. Thus, this belief has
the property of being produced in a reliable way which is a
property-particular. This property-particular confers on the
belief the property of being justified—in my view, the
justifiedness of this belief is a different property-particular
of this particular belief.
If one accepts moral property-particulars, the question
for the truthmaker of propositions with a particular moral
content is easy to answer. The proposition Fred’s action of
hosting the refugee Hasan is morally good is made true by
Fred’s action’s having the property-particular of being
morally good.
2.2 There are Moral Property-Particulars but No
Moral Property-Universals
One might ask: If you assume that there are moral prop-
erty-particulars, why do you assume that there are also
moral property-universals? You should assume entities
only if there is a good reason to. In my view, the
assumption that there are moral property-universals is
justified for a reason similar to that which justifies the
additional assumption of non-moral property-universals.
Some ontologists justify the assumption of property-uni-
versals because they help us to understand natural laws (for
example: Armstrong 1992; Lowe 2006). Similarly, I would
justify the assumption of action-universals and property-
universals on the grounds that they help us understand
moral laws.
moral property-universals are grounded in non-moral property-universals
are instantiated by are instantiated by
moral property particulars are grounded in non-moral property-particulars
Fig. 2 The grounding
relationship
5 Whether moral properties can participate in causal relations is a
highly controversial question which I dare not enter here. See:
Harman (1977), Sturgeon (1988), Leiter (2001), Sturgeon (2006a, b).
6 The comparison is taken from Parfit (2011, 486). However, I do not
intend here to analyze Parfit’s comparison in the context of his
argument.
7 I take this example from Parfit (2011, 486).
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I draw here on ideas presented by Jonathan Lowe.
According to Lowe, such nomological statements as
‘‘Benzene is flammable’’, ‘‘Common salt dissolves in
water’’ or ‘‘Electrons have unit negative charge’’ express
laws of nature. The form of such laws is: ‘‘[…] substantial
kind K is characterized by F-ness, or, even more simply,
K is F.’’ (Lowe 2006, 132) What we have here are two
kinds of universals: substance-universals and property-
universals. The substance-universal is characterized by the
property-universal, or, in other words, the substance-uni-
versal possesses the property-universal. This is how they
are tied together. A law-statement like ‘‘Benzene is flam-
mable’’ denotes a state of affairs consisting in the kind
benzene possessing the property-universal of being flam-
mable. The obtaining of this state of affairs makes the
statement ‘‘Benzene is flammable’’ true (Lowe 2006, 127).
This account of natural laws has several advantages.
First, if we interpret natural laws as universal generaliza-
tions, we are unable to distinguish between law-like and
accidental generalizations. Furthermore, we would have to
say that laws of nature hold because similar particulars
behave in similar ways. However, we would not be in a
position to explain the regularities. The regularities could
be mere coincidences. In contrast, if we account for laws of
nature by assuming substance-universals and property-
universals, then we can explain the regularities. Particular
quantities of benzene possess the disposition or liability of
burning because they are instances of the substance-uni-
versal benzene whose nature is to be flammable (Lowe
2006, 131). This account differs from Armstrong’s account
of laws of nature. According to Armstrong, laws of nature
consist, in their simplest form, in two property-universals
linked to each other by the second-order property-universal
of necessitation. The form of a law is, accordingly, ‘‘F-ness
necessitates G-ness’’ (Armstrong 1983). This account also
offers an explanation for the non-accidental regularity that
obtains between particulars. However, one difficulty of this
view is whether it can account for exceptions. If F-ness
necessitates G-ness, then every particular that exemplifies
F-ness must also exemplify G-ness—but this is not the
case.
Here lies the second advantage of Lowe’s account of
laws of nature: according to it, laws of nature admit
exceptions. One can clarify this by the following consid-
eration. We make such assertions as ‘‘This benzene burns’’.
By this we can either mean that this benzene is disposed to
burn or that this benzene is actually burning. In the first
case, we are talking about a disposition, in the second about
an occurrence. To say that an object has the disposition to
F is to say that it instantiates a kind which is characterized
by a property-universal of being F—which is just the law
K is F. To say that an object is occurrently F is to say that
an object is characterized by the property-particular F-ness
which is an instance of the property-universal of being F. A
law of nature explains the dispositions of an object.
However, the law does not determine the object’s actual
behavior. That this benzene has the power to burn does not
imply that it always burns. According to Lowe’s view, laws
of nature ‘‘determine tendencies amongst the particulars to
which they apply, not their actual behavior, which is a
resultant of many complex interactions implicating a
multiplicity of laws’’. (Lowe 2006, 29) With a law-state-
ment we express how an object is disposed to behave. Such
a statement is not falsified if an object does not actually
behave this way.
I suggest applying this account to moral laws. Accord-
ingly, general substantive moral statements such as
‘‘Helping those in need is morally required’’, ‘‘Promises
ought to be kept’’, ‘‘Killing the innocent is wrong’’ express
moral laws.8 The form of such laws is: action-kind A is
characterized by the property of being M, where M stands
for a moral property. This account involves two kinds of
universals: action-universals and moral property-univer-
sals. They are linked by the action-universal being char-
acterized by the moral property-universal. A statement like
‘‘Helping those in need is morally required’’ denotes a state
of affairs consisting of the action-universal of helping those
in need, which possesses the property-universal of being
morally required. It is this moral law itself which makes the
moral law-statement true.
Now, it is clear that action-universals are neither natural
kinds nor substance kinds, the entities described by natural
laws. However, a parallel construction can nevertheless be
maintained. I consider actions as belonging to the category
of events. If actions are events, then a moral law will
involve an event-universal and a property-universal.
‘‘Killing the innocent is wrong’’ would, then, denote a state
of affairs consisting of the event-universal of innocent
killing which is characterized by the property-universal of
being morally wrong.9
8 I assume that there are fundamental and less fundamental moral
laws. But, for reasons of space, I cannot deal here with the question of
how they are ordered and related to each other.
9 Short comparisons with two similar views are apt at this point. The
first is Marc Murphy’s view of moral laws (Murphy 2011, 30–44). He
utilizes the Armstrong/Dretske/Tooley account of natural laws and
assumes that a moral law consists in a relation between two
universals. For example, the moral law that one should refrain from
killing innocent persons is analyzed in the following way: Being a
killing of an innocent person morally necessitates being refrained
from. The property-universal of being a killing of an innocent person
is related to the property-universal of being refrained from by the
second-order property of being morally necessitating. Murphy claims
that he can account for the fact that moral laws exhibit defeasibility:
‘‘to say that defeasibly, being A morally necessitates being performed
means that in privileged conditions, being A selects being performed,
and so in those privileged conditions the corresponding moral
necessity holds’’ (Murphy 2011, 41–42). According to my account,
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This account of moral laws has advantages over some
other accounts. First, if we were to account for moral laws
in terms of universal generalizations, then we would be
unable to distinguish law-like generalizations from acci-
dental ones.10
Second, we would have to say that a moral law holds
because similar action-particulars have similar moral
properties. The moral law that killing the innocent is wrong
would hold because all instances of killing innocent people
were characterized by the property-particular of being
wrong. However, this does not seem to be the right
direction of explanation. In contrast, if we account for
moral laws in terms of action-universals which are char-
acterized by moral property-universals, then we can
explain the regularity, and the direction of explanation
would go the other way—which seems more intuitive: this
killing of the innocent has the tendency of being wrong
because according to a moral law it belongs to the essence
of the action-universal killing of the innocent to be char-
acterized by the property-universal of being morally
wrong. Fred’s hosting of the refugee Hasan has the ten-
dency of being morally obligatory because it belongs to the
essence of the action-universal of hosting refugees to be
characterized be the property-universal of being morally
obligatory.
A third advantage of this view of moral laws is that it
can account for exceptions. It is a notorious problem for all
who assume the existence of several moral laws that these
laws exhibit defeasibility. Action-particulars are always
embedded in circumstances, and the moral value of an
action-particular also depends on the circumstances. We
saw that, according to Lowe, laws of nature determine
tendencies amongst the particulars to which they apply
rather than determining their actual behavior. Their actual
behavior results from ‘‘many complex interactions impli-
cating a multiplicity of laws’’ (Lowe 2006, 23). Similarly,
laws of morality do not determine the actual moral value of
action-particulars, because action-particulars are embedded
in complex circumstances involving a multiplicity of moral
laws. We assume, for example, that breaking a promise is
morally wrong. Nevertheless, there might be circumstances
in which breaking a promise, because of the involvement
of several moral laws in these circumstances, is the right
course of action. The account of moral laws proposed here
allows the following suggestion: An action-particular
instantiates an action-universal which is characterized by a
moral-property-universal. In virtue of being an instance of
this action-universal, the action-particular has the tendency
of, say, being wrong. That it has this tendency to be wrong,
does not always imply that it is actually wrong. Whether or
not it is actually wrong, that is, whether it has the property-
particular of being wrong, depends on which other moral
laws are involved in the circumstances.
Two traditions in the history of philosophy corroborate
this view. First, according to the scholastic tradition, an
action-particular’s being morally good or bad is determined
not only by the action-universal it might instantiate, but
also by all of the relevant circumstances in which it might
come about, such as: the actor’s intention, the action’s
consequences, the means by which it is performed, ways of
doing something, the place and tie in which the action is
performed, the person who performs it, and so forth.11
Thomas Aquinas gives an illuminating hint concerning
why the circumstances in which an action-particular is
embedded can affect whether it falls under one species of
good and evil rather than another. The explanation is that
the circumstance is itself related to a different moral
norm.12 The moral value of an action-particular is the result
of the many circumstances in which the action is performed
Footnote 9 continued
however, the moral law consists rather in the fact that the action-
universal killing of an innocent person is characterized by the prop-
erty of being wrong. The property of being wrong is not thought to be
a relational property, although it is a property that ontologically
depends on actions and their non-moral properties. A second account
which takes moral properties also to be relational properties is sug-
gested by Aaron Elliott. In his attempt to find a metaphysical
explanation of the supervenience between natural and moral proper-
ties on the general as well as on the specific level, he says that ‘‘moral
properties are specific relations between moral principles and act-
types with certain natural properties’’ (Elliott 2014, 650). What he
seems to assume is that action-types, which are probably considered
to be universals, and moral principles (whose ontological status is not
made clear) are related to each other by a moral property. He says that
it is the ‘‘content of the principle forbidding certain act-types, that
grounds the relational property’’, and later that ‘‘wrongness is just
being prohibited by a moral principle’’. The similarity between
Elliott’s account and mine is that I also assume action-types which I
consider to be action-universals that feature in moral principles or
moral laws. However, I think that the property of being prohibited is
also a moral property. Thus, I see no need to assume additional moral
properties that relate the principles to the action-types. In my view, an
action-type has the moral property-universal of being right/wrong.
And this is just what a moral law consists in.
10 Murphy (2011, 18–21) elaborates some more problems with the
view that moral laws are universal generalisations.
11 See for example Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, 18, 4:
‘‘Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human
action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus;
because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of
goodness, as stated above. Secondly, it has goodness according to its
species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its
accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is
compared as to the cause of its goodness.’’
12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, 18, 10: ‘‘And in this
way, whenever a circumstance respects a special order of reason,
either for or against, the circumstance must give to the moral action
the species, whether good or bad.’’.
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and in which a variety of moral norms may apply.13 Sec-
ond, William D. Ross distinguishes between prima facie
duty and actual duty. He writes: ‘‘We have to distinguish
from the characteristic of being our duty that of tending to
be our duty. Any act that we do contains various elements
in virtue of which it falls under various categories. In virtue
of being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it tends to
be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of relieving dis-
tress it tends to be right. Tendency to be one’s duty may be
called a parti-resultant attribute, i.e. one which belongs to
an act of some single component in its nature. Being one’s
duty is a toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs to an
act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less than
this’’ (Ross 1930, 28). Moral laws determine tendencies of
being good, bad, or obligatory among the action-particulars
to which they apply. But the moral property-particulars
which action-particulars actually have is a result of many
circumstances involving many different moral laws.
3 Moral Properties Have a Similar Ontological
Status as Non-Moral Properties
With a sketch of a moral ontology and some reasons for
favoring it on the table, I will finally discuss the sense in
which these moral entities can be said to exist; or, to put the
question differently, what the ontological status of moral
entities is. By ‘‘moral entities’’ I mean moral properties and
moral facts. According to what one might call Light Moral
Ontology (LMO), there are moral properties and moral
facts but they have no ontological status. Derek Parfit has
recently proposed such a view, which he calls ‘‘Non-Me-
taphysical Cognitivism’’. In what follows I will examine
his position. I will argue that there are no good reasons for
holding LMO.
3.1 Parfit’s Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism
Parfit writes: ‘‘(1) There are some claims that are irre-
ducibly normative in the reason-involving sense, and are in
the strongest sense true. (2) But these truths have no
ontological implications. (3) For such claims to be true,
these reason-involving properties need not exist either as
natural properties in the spatio-temporal world, or in some
non-spatio-temporal part of reality.’’ (Parfit 2011, 486)
Sentence (1) states a version of metaethical cognitivism
according to which (1.1) some normative assertions—for
example, ‘‘It was wrong for Napoleon to invade Russia’’—
are claims and thus have a truth-value; (1.2) these claims
are analytically irreducible to non-normative claims; and
(1.3) some of these claims are in the strongest sense true.
Sentence (2) states that these true normative claims have no
ontological implications. A first exploration of what could
by meant by ‘‘no ontological implications’’ is given in
sentence (3): Although Parfit thinks that ‘‘there are’’ nor-
mative properties and normative facts, he believes neither
that these entities are identical with natural entities which
exist in the spatio-temporal world nor that they exist in
some non-spatio-temporal part of reality. So in what sense
do these entities exist?
Parfit argues against ontological actualism (i.e. the
view that all that exists exists actually) and the view that
‘‘to exist’’ must always be used in the same single, actu-
alist sense. He distinguishes different senses of ‘‘there is’’
or ‘‘to exist’’: first, a wide, general sense in which there
are concrete entities in the spatio-temporal world like the
Earth; but also possible entities like possible persons,
events, and actions which might never actually exist; and
finally abstract entities like propositions, meanings,
numbers, and duties. In addition to existing in this wide
sense, some of these entities, such as the Earth, also exist
in a further, narrow actualist, sense. What about my
possible visit to Aunt Lisbeth? This exists in the wide
sense, but not in the narrow actualist sense. Besides
existing in the wide sense, there is also a possibilist sense
of ‘‘existence’’ in which my possible visit exists. Fur-
thermore, my duty to visit Aunt Lisbeth exists in the wide
sense, but also in a ‘‘distinctive, non-ontological sense’’
(Parfit 2011, 480, 2011, 481, 2011, 719). While my pos-
sible visit to Aunt Lisbeth has lesser ontological status
than my actual visit, my duty to visit her has no onto-
logical status at all. Parfit writes: ‘‘Like numbers and
logical truths, these normative properties and truths have
no ontological status’’ (Parfit 2011, 487), and later, when
speaking about necessary truths, he says: ‘‘[…] these
truths are not about metaphysical reality, since they do not
imply that certain things exist in some ontological sense.’’
(Parfit 2011, 747) Thus, Parfit distinguishes between
truths which are about ‘‘metaphysical reality’’ and truths
which are not about metaphysical reality. Normative
truths are of the latter sort. Although we do not invent
them but rather discover them, such truths have no
ontological implications.
Before assessing this claim, it will be useful to clarify
what Parfit intends to convey by the expressions ‘‘truth’’
and ‘‘distinctive non-ontological sense of existence’’.
With ‘‘a normative truth’’ one could mean
1. a true normative proposition, or
2. a normative fact (or: an obtaining normative state of
affairs)
13 One should distinguish the ontological question from the episte-
mological one. I am dealing here with the ontological question only,
and not with the question of how human beings acquire knowledge or
justified belief concerning which law among several moral laws
applies in certain circumstances.
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Parfit seems to use the word ‘‘normative truth’’ in sense
(1) when he speaks of ‘‘ontological implications’’ or
‘‘claims’’. In this case, a normative truth would be a true
normative proposition. But Parfit also speaks frequently
about normative facts and argues that they are irreducible
to non-normative facts. (Parfit 2011, 324) How does he
conceive of the relationship between (1) and (2)? He
clearly does not think that normative facts make true nor-
mative propositions true. For he writes of necessary truths
in general and thus also of necessary normative truths,
‘‘[…] these necessary truths are not made to be true by
there being some part of reality to which these truths cor-
respond.’’ (Parfit 2011, 747) Presumably, he thinks that
true normative propositions are identical with normative
facts. This interpretation is also suggested by a non-moral
example given by Parfit. He writes,
(O) It might have been true that nothing ever existed:
no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not even space or
time.
Some might object that (O) could not have been true, for
if nothing ever existed, then there would be the truth that
nothing existed, and this would be self-contradictory. Parfit
thinks that the objection fails because (O) ‘‘is a claim about
all the kinds of entities that might exist in an ontological
sense […] But truths themselves do not have to exist in
such a sense. Truths need only be true.’’ (Parfit 2011, 482)
Parfit’s remark here makes it plausible to suppose that with
‘‘true normative propositions’’ he means the same as with
‘‘normative facts’’.
Now to the second clarification, the clarification of the
expression ‘‘distinctive non-ontological sense of exis-
tence’’. Parfit distinguishes many senses of ‘‘existence’’.
Here is a list, though probably not an exhaustive one, of
these senses:
1. the one wide sense, which I’ll call ‘‘existence1’’;
2. the narrow actualist sense (i.e., entities that exist as
concrete parts of the spatio-temporal world), which I’ll
call ‘‘existence2’’;
3. the possibilist sense, which I’ll call ‘‘existence3’’;
4. the distinctive non-ontological sense, which I’ll call
‘‘existence4’’.
My question concerns ‘‘existence4’’. What does the
distinctive non-ontological sense of ‘‘exist’’ consist in?
Parfit gives us only negative characterizations: it is neither
the narrow actualist nor the possibilist sense. Going from
semantics to ontology, he speaks of entities which have
‘‘no ontological status’’, and of truths which are ‘‘not about
metaphysical reality’’ (Parfit 2011, 481, 2011, 747), and
again: ‘‘These properties and truths are not, in relevant
senses, either actual or merely possible, or either real or
unreal.’’ (Parfit 2011, 478) So far I have presented an
outline of Parfit’s position. But what are his reasons for
holding this stance which I call Light Moral Ontology
(LMO)? In what follows I will reconstruct three possible
reasons for holding LMO: an epistemological reason, a
semantic reason and an ontological reason.
3.2 Some Reasons for Endorsing Light Moral
Ontology (LMO)
(1) A first reason might be epistemological. The question
is: How do we go about discovering whether a claim is
true? If ‘‘we must answer some questions about what
exists, in an ontological sense’’, then claims do have
ontological implications (Parfit 2011, 479). However, if we
don’t need to answer this question, then claims need not
have any ontological implications. Take mathematical
claims such as that there are prime numbers greater than
100. In order to find out whether such a claim is true, we
‘‘don’t need to answer the question whether numbers really
exist in an ontological sense, though not in space and
time.’’ (Parfit 2011, 479–480).
This is how Parfit reasons, but this reason is disputable.
It is right that we proceed differently in order to solve
different questions in different areas. However, whether
this epistemological observation suffices to make the
ontological divide is dubious. We do not have to ask
whether numbers exist in an ontological but not spatio-
temporal sense when we try to discover whether there are
prime numbers greater than 100, but this implies only that,
in order to answer questions about certain entities, we do
not need to ask after the sense in which these entities exist.
However, this does not imply that these entities have no
ontological status. Applied to morality: There are questions
in morality which can be answered without having to ask
whether moral properties exist or in what sense they exist.
In order to find out whether I ought to visit my Aunt Lis-
beth, I do not need to ask whether the property of being
obligatory exists and in what sense it exists. However, this
is no reason to suppose that we could not also ask these
questions and that this duty could not exist also in some
ontological sense of ‘‘exists’’.
(2) A second reason for endorsing LMO might be
semantic. Concerning necessary truths in general, Parfit
writes: ‘‘And since these truths are necessary, they do not
have to be made true by some part of reality to which they
correspond. This dependence goes the other way. It is
reality that must correspond to these truths.’’ (Parfit 2011,
749) Since he believes that (some) normative truths are
necessary, then on his view these truths do not have to be
made true by some part of reality to which they correspond.
I have three comments to make on this remark. First: Do
necessary truths have no truthmakers? I would maintain
that they do have truthmakers. Usually, necessary truths are
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divided into the analytic and the synthetic. In order to make
progress here, we ought to distinguish:
1. true sentences
2. true propositions
3. facts as truthmakers.
Let us first look at analytic sentences. Analytic sen-
tences are said to be true ‘‘in virtue’’ of the meanings of the
words in the sentence. ‘‘Green is a color’’ is an example of
an analytic sentence. To be a color is part of the meaning of
the word ‘‘green’’. Going from words to concepts, we
might say: The concept of being a color belongs to the
concept of being green. Now, do analytic sentences have
truthmakers? One possible answer would be: Yes, the
sentence ‘‘Green is a color’’, or the proposition that green is
a color, is made true by the fact that the concept being a
color belongs to the concept being green; in other words,
by the fact that the conceptual implications obtain.14 My
preferred answer, however, carries a larger ontological
commitment: The proposition that green is a color is made
true by the fact that the property-universal of being green
has the higher-order property-universal of being a color.
What does it mean, then, that analytic sentences are true
‘‘in virtue’’ of the meanings of the words in the sentence? I
would say, in this context, that the expression ‘‘in virtue’’
does not indicate that the meanings of the words are the
truthmakers of the sentence but rather that the truth of the
sentence is already implied by the meanings of the words.
Synthetic sentences can also be necessarily true. Claims
of scientific identity like ‘‘Heat is molecular kinetic
energy’’ are examples of such sentences. ‘‘Heat is molec-
ular kinetic energy’’ expresses the proposition that heat is
molecular kinetic energy. This proposition is true. Does it
have a truthmaker? A possible answer would be: The
proposition is made true by the fact that it is molecular
kinetic energy that can make objects have all the properties
which are denoted by the complex concept of heat, for
example, the property of turning solids into liquids, of
turning liquids into gases, or of causing us to have certain
sensations.15
Parfit assumes both analytic and substantial (i.e., non-
analytic) normative propositions. His example of an ana-
lytic normative sentence is: ‘‘If some man was punished for
some crime that he is known not to have committed, this
man’s punishment could not be just’’ (Parfit 2011, 490).
One could say: Being unjust belongs to the concept pun-
ishing innocent people. According to my view, what makes
the proposition true is a moral law which consists of the
action-universal of punishing the innocent having the
moral property-universal of being unjust.
Parfit’s example of a substantial normative sentence that
is not analytic is: ‘‘We have reasons to prevent or relieve
the suffering of any conscious being, if we can’’ (Parfit
2011, 747). In my view, the truthmaker for this non-ana-
lytic sentence is the moral law consisting in the action-
universal of preventing or relieving the suffering of any
conscious being having the moral property-universal of
being right.
My second remark is this: Not all true moral proposi-
tions are true necessarily. There are also contingently true
moral propositions. Whenever we claim that a particular
action is morally good, bad, obligatory, and so forth, such a
claim would, if it were true, not necessarily be true. I
suppose that the proposition that in invading Russia
Napoleon acted wrongly is a contingently true moral
proposition. If necessarily true moral propositions needed
no truthmakers because they were necessarily true, what
about contingent moral propositions? Wouldn’t they still
need truthmakers?
One might be inclined to respond that contingent moral
propositions are derived from combining necessary moral
propositions with contingent non-moral ones, such as:
1. It is morally wrong to bring about immense suffering.
2. In invading Russia, Napoleon brought about immense
suffering.
3. It was morally wrong for Napoleon to invade Russia.
Proposition (3) is a contingent moral proposition which
is derived from the necessary moral proposition (1) and the
contingent non-moral proposition (2), and therefore the
search for a truthmaker for contingently true moral
propositions is misguided—so the objection goes.
Now, it is true to say that contingent moral propositions
are derived from necessary moral propositions. However,
this is a logical or epistemological claim which does not
make the search for a truthmaker for (3) misguided. I can
make the point with a non-moral example. The proposition
Napoleon is mortal is derivable from the propositions All
humans are mortal plus Napoleon is a human. From this, it
does not follow that the proposition Napoleon is mortal
does not have a truthmaker. It is Napoleon’s mortality that
makes the proposition that Napoleon is mortal true. Simi-
larly, from the fact that a contingent moral proposition is
derived from a necessary moral proposition plus a contin-
gent non-moral proposition, it does not follow that the
contingent moral proposition does not have a truthmaker.
My third remark concerns Parfit’s claim that, since these
truths are necessary, ‘‘they do not have to be made true by
some part of reality to which they correspond. This depen-
dence goes the other way. It is reality that must correspond to
14 Armstrong (2012, 70), voices this idea when he says: ‘‘[…] the
truthmakers for analytic truths are the meanings of the words or
symbols in which these truths are expressed.’’
15 I am using Parfit’s analysis of scientific identity claims; see Parfit
(2011, 335).
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these truths’’ (Parfit 2011, 749).What he seems tomean is the
following: True moral propositions are not of the kind which
must fit the world. It is the other way round. It is the world
that ought to fit the moral propositions. I would say: Of
course, we want reality to correspond to true moral propo-
sitions in the sense that people act in ways that fulfill the
requirements set out in those propositions. However, this
does not mean that there couldn’t also be a moral reality to
which true moral propositions correspond. Parfit’s claim
seems to presuppose that ‘‘metaphysical reality’’ is restricted
to actual, space–time reality. But why should we accept this
presupposition?
(3) A third consideration for endorsing LMO might be
ontological. Parfit holds that predicates express concepts
many of which refer to properties (Parfit 2011, 264). He
also believes in the existence of properties which no par-
ticular thing has, such as the property of being the first man
to walk on the Sun (Parfit 2011, 264). This claim suggests
that he assumes properties to be universals some of which
are and some of which are not exemplified by particular
things. Parfit does not explicitly deal with the ontology of
properties. I presume, however, that he believes in prop-
erty-universals, and would say that they exist not only in
the wide sense but also in the distinctive non-ontological
sense of ‘‘exist’’. Hence property-universals generally
would plausibly enjoy ‘‘existence1’’ and ‘‘existence4’’, but
not ‘‘existence2’’.
If I am right in reconstructing Parfit’s view, I would
have three remarks to make. First, he seems to assume
properties which are not instantiated, like the property of
being the first man to walk on the Sun. I would doubt that
such properties exist at all. I only assume the existence of
property-universals which have instances.16 Moral prop-
erty-universals have millions and millions of instances and
are thus ontologically not on a pair with a ‘‘property’’ like
being the first man to walk on the Sun.
Second, let us compare moral property-universals with
non-moral property-universals which do have instances. I
see no reason to deny moral-property-universals the onto-
logical status which non-moral-property-universals are said
to enjoy. I agree with Parfit that such property-universals
do not exist as spatio-temporal entities in the world.
However, I would not draw the conclusion that they have
no ontological status.
Third, it is not clear to me whether Parfit believes in the
existence of property-particulars. I gave some reason for
believing that they exist. If the particular greenness of a
particular chair exists, it would be an entity in space and time.
It would be reasonable to suppose that this greenness of this
particular chair has not only ‘‘existence1’’ but also ‘‘exis-
tence2’’. The same point applies in the moral case:
Napoleon’s action of invadingRussia is an event in space and
time. This event exemplifies non-moral properties, such as
bringing about immense suffering. These properties are
property-particulars of this action and thus also entities in
space and time. In virtue of these non-moral properties, the
action exemplifies the moral property of being wrong, again
a particular property of this action. It would be reasonable to
suppose that this particular wrongness of this particular
action has not only ‘‘existence1’’ but also ‘‘existence2’’.
4 Conclusion
This was an attempt to draw a sketch of a rich non-re-
ductive moral ontology: its basic elements and the rela-
tionships between them. This ontology accounts for
truthmaking of general moral statements like ‘‘Helping
those in need is morally good/required’’ as well as of
particular moral statements like ‘‘Fred’s hosting the refu-
gee Hasan is morally good’’. A general moral statement is
made true by a moral law consisting of an action-universal
which is characterized by a moral property-universal. A
particular moral statement is made true by the action-par-
ticular’s being characterized by the moral property-partic-
ular. Moreover, I have tried to argue that there is no reason
to deny moral properties ontological status. Since I dis-
tinguish between property-universals and property-partic-
ulars, I would maintain, first, that moral property-
universals have the same ontological status as non-moral
property-universals; second, that moral property-universals
have millions and millions of instances, that they are
exemplified by countless actions and characters of persons
in this spatio-temporal world. Third, I maintain that these
moral property-instances or -particulars have the same
ontological status as non-moral property-particulars. Thus
in my view there is no ontological difference (in terms of
ontological status) between non-moral property-universals
and moral property-universals, and between non-moral
property-particulars and moral property-particulars.
Acknowledgments Open access funding provided by University of
Innsbruck and Medical University of Innsbruck.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Armstrong D (1983) What is a law of nature?. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge16 See footnote 1.
B. Niederbacher
123
Armstrong D (1992) Properties. In: Mulligan K (ed) Language, truth
and ontology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 14–27
Armstrong D (1997) A world of states of affairs. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Armstrong D (2012) A sketch for a systematic metaphysics. Oxford
University Press, Oxford
Bradley FH (1893) Appearance and reality. Swan Sonnenschein,
London
Correia F, Schnieder B (eds) (2012) Metaphysical grounding.
Understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge University
Press, New York
Elliott A (2014) Can moral principles explain supervenience? Res
Philos. 91(4):629–659
Harman G (1977) The nature of morality. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
Leiter B (2001) Moral facts and best explanations. Soc Philos Policy
18:79–101
Lowe EJ (2006) The four-category ontology. A metaphysical
foundation for natural science. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lowe EJ (2010) A neo-aristotelian substance ontology: neither
relational nor constituent. In: Tahko TE (ed) Contemporary
aristotelian metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp 229–248
Murphy MC (2011) God and moral law. On the theistic explanation of
morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Parfit D (2011) On what matters, vol II. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
Ross WD (1930) The right and the good. Clarendon, Oxford
Sturgeon N (1988) Moral explanations. In: Sayre-McCord G (ed)
Essays on moral realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
pp 229–255
Sturgeon N (2006a) Moral explanations defended. In: Dreier J (ed)
Contemporary debates in moral theory. Blackwell Publishing,
Malden, pp 241–262
Sturgeon N (2006b) Ethical naturalism. In: Copp D (ed) The oxford
handbook of ethical theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 91–121
An Ontological Sketch for Robust Non-Reductive Realists
123
